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Affirmation Without Opinion and the Right of One Co-Tenant to Sue
Another In Conversion
It is submitted that as a proposition of law one co-tenant does not have
a right of action for conversion against another in this state at the present
time. Following what is obviously an inept and thoroughly discredited prac-
tice of affirming decisions without written opinion, the Supreme Court re-
cently upheld a decision of the district court in the case of Weber vs. Seilbach
et al., 118 Colo. 578, allowing such a suit.
A complete transcript of the whole record and the entire testimony in
the case, together with lengthy and detailed law briefs with full specifications
of error, were filed in the Supreme Court. The only result was an evasion
of the argument entirely by the terse affirmation of what appears to us to
have been an unwholesome and indefensible verdict and judgment in the trial
court.
The right to maintain the suit in the district court at Greeley was at-
tacked at the outset by a motion to dismiss. This right was contested through-
out the entire suit. It was directly in issue in the case, was pointed out on
the motion for a new trial, and by the specification of points to the Supreme
Court. Even after the case had gone to decision, the error was again pointed
out in a petition for a rehearing, but the Supreme Court steadfastly refused
to discuss or rule upon this point.
(Mr. Weber thereupon submitted his brief, too long to be reprinted
here, on the point of law which was urged as ground for dismissal. In sub-
stance, the brief supported the proposition that since Section 3603 of the
Revised Statutes of 1908, permitting one co-tenant to sue another, had been
repealed by Section 11 of the Laws of 1932 at page 456, then the general
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common law rule should prevail that trover will not lie in favor of one co-
tenant against another.)
Many of the younger members of the Colorado bar may make the same
mistake that I made several times early in my career, i.e. assume that be-
cause a certain Supreme Court decision exists which by its terms unequivo-
cally lays down a proposition of law, then that is the law, and clients may
be safely advised accordingly. This writer is one who has lived to learn
differently, and to know that the appellate court will sometimes for reasons
of expediency, or, because it believes a just result is obtained by ignoring or
overriding its former decision, completely disregard its own precedent.
The device by which this evasion is accomplished is known to the initiate
as "Affirmed Without Written Opinion." It is my position that such affirma-
tions, when they ignore former decisions of the high court, or, override them
without distinguishing those decisions from the case at bar, tend to make
the court appear whimsical and inconsistent, and, in the end, destroy the
prestige of the court.
OLIVER W. WEBER,
Boulder.
Is Double Mileage Authorized In Serving Writs?
Mr. George Fischer, County Attorney
Adams County
Brighton, Colorado
Re: Two mileage fees to be paid Sheriff by litigant for serving process 15
miles, i.e.
2 writs, same address at 75c 1.50
30 miles roundtrip at Sc 2.40
30 miles roundtrip at Sc 2.40
Total 6.30
Paid 3.90
Balance objected to 2.40
In response to your letter . . . when I objected to paying the above $2.40
to the sheriff, I thought he was charging double mileage because two writs
were served-and I quoted the eighth paragraph of Sec. 16, C 66 as for-
bidding it.
However, my note to him stated that if he thought I was wrong an
additional check would be sent. He apparently thinks me wrong, so I am
sending him an additional check-but with the understanding that if you
and he subsequently are convinced that opinion is against you, you will
return the $2.40.
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Now to answer the unexpected question you raise of double mileage
being otherwise authorized: You apparently urge that a litigant must pay
one mileage pursuant to Sec. 16, C 66 and a second mileage pursuant to
Sec. 76, C 66. (Facetiousness is here irresistible-and one must add: "nice
work if you can swing it-this would pay for a number of deputies-but
things are getting tough all over").
To respond that this contention is unheard of-is true enough, though
not a legal response. However, annotations to Sec. 76 refer one back to
Sec. 16, where the annotations thereunto refer to Sec. 76 as providing a
"separate and distinct mileage" and cite 21 Colo. 158. Language there at
pp. 167, 168 suggests, rather than the radical departure from normal of a
double mileage, that Sec. 16 (the fee act) was meant to prescribe what the
litigant pays and Sec. 76 (the salary act), to prescribe what the officer keeps.
This language is as follows: "* * * in the main, the one relates to fees,
the other to salaries. The former prescribes what charges the officers may
make, and what fees they may collect, out of which their salaries are to be
realized; the latter fixes the salary and the maximum of the total remunera-
tion. * * * The salary act was intended to provide a compensation to public
officers, and among them to a sheriff, for the performance of official duties.
Such compensation, however, must be paid out of the fees prescribed, and
out of them only. * * *"
As two lawyers are no more likely to agree then when others argue
religion-and as I would like to create some sort of issue without the ex-
pense of litigation-I will enclose a copy of this to DICTA. Also, an informa-




Information regarding changes in listings in the Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory (1950 edition) for subscribers as well as non-subscribers, including
the address of a former firm member or associate if known, should reach the
publisher at Summit, New Jersey, not later than September 20th. If so re-
quested, this information will be held in confidence until the publication date
which will be about January 1st, 1950.
Charles J. Traylor of the law firm of Adams, Heckman & Traylor,
Grand Junction, has been appointed by Governor Knous as a member of the
Colorado Board of Veterans Affairs.
H. Lawrence Hinkley, former Attorney General, has announced the
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